Joint operations doctrine omits the agency of artificial intelligence (AI) in the operational information environment, which is a problem. This commentary discusses why, and recommends effective changes. Key points are as follows. AI is becoming an autonomous cause of unanticipated effects. Humans are not the most effectively intelligent actors in all environments, yet our doctrine draws lessons from the past rather than anticipating emergent futures. Machines currently excel in experience-based learning and can discover relationships in data that we cannot discern. Humans can intuit, deceive, somewhat control, and manufacture and destroy machines. In time, AI will be able to perform those cognitive, informational and physical functions as well. As out-thought becomes out-fought, we need proactive doctrine now.Read more
Quantitative analysis is a powerful tool, but it will never precisely solve the riddle of warfare despite repeated promises to the contrary.Read more
In this article, OTH brings you a reading list compiled by contributing editor Dr. Jeff Reilly to equip readers with the necessary elements to discuss the why and how of multi-domain.Read more
Today’s editor’s pick was chosen by Julie Janson. In it, Tom Flounders makes a compelling argument that the Human Domain is the decisive domain.Read more
Leaders must remember that risk is inherent in all military operations. Identify the risk, mitigate the risk, and accept prudent risk.Read more
This year, Over the Horizon will present a series of articles related to the Human Domain to promote conversation about this critical, but often ignored, domain.Read more
Joint Doctrine does not sufficiently and separately address risk as both a necessary part of military operations and as a series of hazards to the force. Risk is not just a list of “things to avoid and mitigate,” but instead must be identified and categorized into two separate classes: accidental and operational. A conflation of these two types of risk directly contributes to the perception that the US military is a “risk averse” organization that refuses to allow for and appropriately reward prudent risk-taking. Thusly, Joint Doctrine must specify the differences between accidental and operational risk in a more deliberate way than it currently does in order to provide clarity to commanders and staffs.Read more
The military is at a crossroads. Overmatch in firepower and maneuver led to its past successes, but they alone cannot win tomorrow’s wars. The concept of MDB is a method for today’s tactical leaders to change the playing field of tomorrow’s wars.Read more
Future jointness demands fundamental changes to organizing, training, and equipping the joint force to meet combatant commander multi-domain requirements.
By Mike Benitez
During the next two weeks, OTH will offer several articles to discuss the overall mindset and scope of multi-domain operations.Read more
The United States Air Force’s definition of airpower is merely a description of all Air Force activities and is incorrect.
By Tom Flounders
Change in the operational environment between now and 2036 requires the Air Force to aggressively develop a vertical and/or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) tactical airlift platform.
By Matthew Andrews