DCGS Next Generation: Accelerating Change to Deliver Decision Advantage
By Kelly Borukhovich and Tyler Morton Approximate reading time: 11 minutes Abstract: The DCGS Next Generation (DCGS Next Gen) delivers
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Author: Over The Horizon
Supply Chain Competition and All-Effects Warfare: Achieving Strategic Advantage (Part 2 of 2)
Executive Summary: Our previous article on supply chain competition and warfare explained how political, economic, and security issues unleash and restrain strategies of competitive advantage. China is waging all-effects warfare. Meanwhile, democratic states and the US compete with a self-imposed disadvantage: inferior operating strategy at the strategic level of significance. How can we compete and when necessary, wage superior complex warfare in kind?
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Supply Chain Competition and All-Effects Warfare: Fundamentals of Strategic Advantage (Part 1 of 2)
Executive Summary: In the hands of authoritarian powers, supply chains are systematically weaponized into broad warfare that subsumes democracies’ traditionally narrow military approach. This series analyzes supply chain competition, warfare, and strategy in two parts. Part I discusses fundamentals that set strategic parameters for achieving an “all-effects” advantage: globalization and protectionism; strategies of national security; incentives and risks; and political and technological change. This broad perspective on competition and warfare is necessary to implement the cooperative and confrontational competition prescribed in the US National Security Strategy. Part II identifies decisions and makes recommendations to combine superior “all-effects” using diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and social instruments of power. This integrative perspective is necessary to synergize strategic advantages derived from the US National Defense Strategy and sixteen other national security-related strategies.
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Information Warfare on United States’ Citizens: How China Weaponized COVID-19
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is conducting an information warfare (IW) campaign against the United States (U.S.) and other strategic competitors in an attempt to protect its interests and limit its strategic losses caused by COVID-19. The PRC went through great lengths to misrepresent the severity of the virus and suppress information that would have potentially helped the international community. Once it realized it could no longer suppress this emerging threat, it shifted its IW campaign to projecting misinformation and blaming the U.S. for the virus’ rapid spread. The following assessment categorizes the PRCs IW campaign and briefly highlights the growing need for a whole of government approach to protect the U.S against adversary IW campaigns.
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Métis: Strategic Sense for a Wicked World
Abstract: The U.S. defense community regularly acknowledges changes in the character of modern warfare. These observations are often coupled with a variety of recommendations, such as creating more strategic thinkers and cultivating more agile service cultures. This article highlights the tangled interactions between these two challenges as well as a third: harnessing the power of storytelling. First, stories both reflect and influence an organization’s culture, and are therefore a useful tool for strategic thinkers. Second, when it comes to strategic thinking, the typical descriptions and illustrations used by defense professionals are incomplete and biased. Missing from this list of examples, for instance, is someone from the origins of Western civilization who personified the wisdom to convert “insight into a decisive asymmetry.” This ancient role model not only exemplifies the strategic sense necessary to prepare the joint force’s culture for modern operating environments, but is also closely linked to the third element of this trinity – storytelling.
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Cognitive Electronic Warfare: A Move Towards EMS Maneuver Warfare
In multi-domain operations (MDO), control of the electromagnetic spectrum is of paramount importance. By leveraging machine learning technologies coupled to advanced Electronic Warfare techniques, a key first step will be taken in enabling maneuver warfare within the spectrum.
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Upgrading the Future Joint Force Leader: Three Recommendations for Joint Education: Part 2
The Joint force is pursuing innovative ways to reshape Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as part of a larger effort to prepare leaders for the future security environment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recently published a new Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and guidance for “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War,” but also admit that the process is iterative and must be continually reassessed to ensure relevance. This is the second of a two-part series which provides three recommendations in line with this guidance. Those recommendations include incorporating “…hunger for knowledge…” as a Desired Leader Attribute (DLA), incorporation of Dr. Jeffrey Reilly’s “Strategic Design” methodology within the curriculum, and additional Joint All Domain (JAD) maneuver instruction and wargames. These suggestions would assist JPME in developing future operational and strategic leaders. PART 1 discussed the first recommendation; PART 2 discusses the second two recommendations.
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Upgrading the Future Joint Force Leader: Three Recommendations for Joint Education: Part 1
The Joint Force is pursuing innovative ways to reshape Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as part of a larger effort to prepare leaders for the future security environment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recently published a new Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and guidance for “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War,” but also admit that the process is iterative and must be continually reassessed to ensure relevance. This is the first of a two-part series which provides three recommendations in line with this guidance. Those recommendations include incorporating “…hunger for knowledge…” as a Desired Leader Attribute (DLA), incorporation of Dr. Jeffrey Reilly’s “Strategic Design” methodology within the curriculum, and additional Joint All Domain (JAD) maneuver instruction and wargames. These suggestions would assist JPME in developing future operational and strategic leaders. PART 1 discusses the first recommendation; PART 2 discusses the second two recommendations.
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Do We Still Have a Coalition of the Willing? Reinforcing National Security through Dedicated Cultural Training
The U.S. has been working with collation partners for decades to address matters of global and national security. Alongside over 80 partner nations, the U.S. has accomplished milestones in the Global Fight against ISIS, which would not have been possible without such a combined front. Part of these successes are due to the DoD’s shift a decade ago to incorporate partner nations in our military processes to fuse holistic intelligence for decisionmakers through multiple coalition intelligence cells around the world. As the battlespace continues to shift from years of counterinsurgency to face revisionist powers and rogue states, the personnel identified to fill critical positions that interact with coalition members will determine the successes of future conflicts. This essay will describe some recent advances the US Air Force has made toward improving coalition intelligence operations and recommend ways to improve selection and training programs in the future.
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Communications in Multi-Domain Operations: What Does the BACN Bring?
Communications are an important element of any military operation. A lack of infrastructure and rough terrain have hindered U.S. military operations in Afghanistan (2001-Present) and Iraq (2003-Present). The difficulties encountered in both countries initially led to several different ad hoc solutions for overcoming poor communications. Eventually a long-term solution emerged, known as BACN (Battlefield Airborne Communications Node) with two dedicated platforms, an E-11A and EQ-4B. This article provides new insights on the BACN program and its history, and considers the importance of E-11s providing BACN for future multi-domain warfighting environments. Finally, it encourages new ways of thinking on how to operate in a contested environment, proposing a “BACN-mesh” concept as a way of overcoming such a vulnerability with an adversary jamming the electromagnetic spectrum.
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War is a Learning Competition: How a Culture of Debrief Can Improve Multi-Domain Operations
The Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) community continues to evolve and progress. MDO is, and will be the fundamental enabler for Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the way our nation fights future wars. As the maturing community integrates new concepts and processes, Multi-Domain Operators must identify and engrain the valuable lessons along the way. Creating a set of standards to capture feedback and drive improvement is vital for development in any organization. The debrief culture of the US Air Force fighter community, among others, is well known for its direct, highly effective feedback and learning methods. This type of focused feedback is important to the fighter community because the debrief is where the majority of learning takes place. The MDO community would benefit greatly by utilizing this debrief culture as a model from which to develop its own unique culture of consistent, iterative improvement. Because a standard day, or sortie-equivalent, is not yet fully fleshed out for Multi-Domain Operators, the purpose of this paper is to convey the necessity for debriefing lessons learned, and provide best practices in their current form. The ultimate objective is to create a foundation for the MDO community to adapt these practices as the details and nuance of its daily execution become more specific and clear.
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Defense Of The Homeland In A New Age, Part III
Editor’s note: The following article is the third of a three-part series discussing necessary advancements which will best enable the Department of Defense to continue to lead during current and future periods of competition. Part I focused on the history of the current threats, Part II outlined areas of defense and civilian research which must be pursued, and Part III delves into the path forward for cohesive, joint application of technology and research.
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Defense Of The Homeland In A New Age, Part II
Editor’s note: The following article is the second of a three-part series discussing necessary advancements which will best enable the Department of Defense to continue to lead during current and future periods of competition. Part I focused on the history of the current threats, Part II outlines areas of defense and civilian research which must be pursued, and Part III delves into the path forward for cohesive, joint application of technology and research.
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Defense Of The Homeland In A New Age, Part I
Editor’s note: The following article is the first of a three-part series discussing necessary advancements which will best enable the Department of Defense to continue to lead during current and future periods of competition. Part I briefly reviews threats America has faced thru history and those which it currently faces across all domains. Part II outlines areas of defense and civilian research which must be pursued, and Part III delves into the path forward for cohesive, joint application of technology and research.
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Dust
Science Fiction has always been a vehicle to the future. In the modern era of conversations about complexity, AI, human machine interfaces, and other exotic ideas, the genre can provide a way to stitch things together. We can take all of these disparate developments, operating concepts, and fuzzy ideas and combine them the same way our ancestors made sense of the word: with a story. At the strategic level, the two nations in conflict here have taken a markedly different approach to developing today’s technological trends. The enemy nation of Donovia has invested heavily in autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI), taking a bet that they can teach and grow better algorithms. Christopherson’s side, however, has taken a more balanced approach to integrating AI and autonomy by preserving man-on-the-loop for action and keeping their strategic level AI providing intelligence fusion. Different strategies will influence the future of technology development, but more importantly strategy will dictate how we use those technologies.
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Building Bridges Instead of Breaking Glass: What Past Scientific Revolutions Suggest About Creating Collaborative Transformation
By: Peter Hickman Approximate Reading Time: 15 minutes The Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System is a transformative effort that
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Water Wars and Humanitarian Crises in Asia
One half of the world’s population lives within Southeast Asia. The natural resources that allowed massive populations in past generations are now being stretched to their limit as those nations are industrializing. While regions such as the Middle East have struggled with water for decades, Southern Asia is facing a water crisis on a scale that cannot be matched in scope and impact to population. Current policy decisions and preparation will determine the way ahead; however, it remains likely that the next generation of Western militaries will spend their careers performing peacekeeping roles in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Rather than anti-piracy operations like those in the Gulf of Aden, peacekeeping operations will deter state-sponsored threats and defend key lines of communication to secure life-sustaining resources, specifically water, for billions of citizens.
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Command in Complexity: Scaling Trust for Effective Joint All Domain Operations
Complex environments necessitate a high level of trust for effective command and control. Special Operations Forces have leveraged their ability to form personal relationships to generate trust and achieve high performing teams. While they cannot rely on personal relationships, conventional forces must also find a way to forge trust to enable effective Joint All Domain Operations. They can do this through strategic education, rapid and relevant doctrine, and shared experiences, all of which require an institutional level focus at all levels of the joint force.
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The Evolution of the Air Aggressor
Current USAF Aggressor airframes lack the capability to effectively replicate the operational advanced fighter weapon systems fielded by near-peer adversaries China and Russia. Additionally, with only two Air Aggressor squadrons across the USAF, there is a lack of requisite capacity to fully support the advanced air-to-air training requirements of the Combat Air Force. Despite initiatives such as the Air Combat Command Advanced Adversary Air contract awarded in October of 2019 and plans to establish an F-35A Aggressor Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, the Aggressors will likely still lack the necessary capacity to support a routine and robust advanced air-to-air training environment. These issues highlight a need to not only modernize the current fleet of Aggressor F-16Cs, but to also seek an innovative approach to acquire an affordable, indigenous, advanced replication capability within the USAF. Procurement of a 5th generation fighter-type unmanned aerial system, the Aggressor UAS, developed to augment manned Aggressors with advanced adversary replication would not only solve current capability and capacity shortfalls, but also posture the USAF Aggressors to satisfy future adversary replication requirements.
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Deepening the Cut: How China’s Genetic Warfare is Affecting International Relations
Gene editing is relatively new territory and is stretching to greater lengths than ever before. What continues to puzzle policymakers and global leaders—despite the expressed benefits—is just how far gene editing experimentation will go. Future developments will ultimately affect the earth’s entire population and international affairs. This article provides a historical context of biological warfare and shifts towards understanding the contemporary dangers of biological-genetic warfare, which are being advanced to dangerous heights by China.
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Infrastructure Readiness In The United States Space Force
The men and women of the US military have been protecting and defending the space domain for decades—well before the existence of the United States Space Force. Evolving threats in space drive the country to think differently about how we protect and defend that domain to ensure freedom of maneuver for future generations. Protection begins in facilities supported by robust infrastructure systems that house command and control nodes for space operators worldwide. USSF’s civil engineers have created new standards and are implementing them to measure and track readiness of the facilities and infrastructure directly supporting and inextricably linked to mission success in space.
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Beyond Advice – Operationalizing the Light Attack Aircraft
The Light Attack Aircraft (LAA) is a useful asset to help partner nations provide sustainable air support in irregular conflicts as the US Air Force increasingly shifts focus to near-peer competition. To turn the LAA into an effective security cooperation tool, the US Air Force must work through the intellectual side of the problem, which will include working with partners to develop sustainable concepts that maximize the utility of light attack capabilities in their unique irregular conflicts.
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Connect to Divide: Social Media in 21st Century Warfare
In 21st Century warfare, social media fuels influence through “likes,” “shares,” and “tweets” driving narratives that blur the lines of politics, law, war, peace, elections, and freedom of speech and press, creating an information crisis. The current lack of an adequate United States (US) response to this crisis threatens its democratic institutions and national security. Bolstering this emerging threat are social media platforms rewarding users for engaging as fast thinkers without regard for bias or manipulation that is being exploited by hostile state and non-state actors to create narratives resulting in the decay of truth. Compounding this problem is social media’s ability to transition influence from institutions and governments to the individual. Though social media-enabled information warfare alone may not be decisive in current and future conflicts, nations must prepare to counter its effects across all instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
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Convergence within SOCOM – A Bottom-Up Approach to Multi Domain Operations
This paper argues the DoD should apply the SOF construct of earned trust and interpersonal relationships in order to be successful in future Multi Domain Operations. The author describes how intelligently and appropriately pushing decision making abilities to the lowest possible level will mitigate the communication challenges that will be prevalent in future conflict.
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Human-led Machine Learning & Advanced Threats: Case Method Inquiry and Visual Analytics Applied to COVID-19
In a pervasive and complex information environment, analytics are vital to understanding advanced threats. As we rely more on machine-learnt results, asking the right questions and visualizing deep analysis are key to grasping and solving problems. These skills are also vital 21st century leadership tools that can forge a common focus among otherwise stove-piped specialists.
The COVID-19 pandemic presents an urgent threat that requires both scientific understanding and decisive leadership. The cause of the disease is SARS CoV-2, a mutating virus that thrives in conditions difficult to control at scale. To counter this threat, this article demonstrates in detail the potential of human-led case method and machine-provided visual analytics.
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Joint All Domain Effects Convergence: Evolving C2 Teams
By: Ernest Nisperos Approximate Reading Time: 25 Minutes Abstract This paper aims to generate a tangible construct to complement the
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Terahertz Technologies and Future Security Environments
The terahertz (THz) frequency band is a fascinating and relatively unexplored part of the larger electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). THz can enable users to ‘see-through’ materials and structures and is now widely used in laboratory quality control testing, for non-destructive testing and transmitting information between servers in close proximity. However, because the transmitted signal degrades rapidly in the atmosphere, its application is limited to controlled settings. Soon, technological leaps will enable development of power sources that will prevent THz degradation in the atmosphere and at distance. When this happens, THz will be an exquisite tool to help the United States find and target items of interest. It will allow intelligence professionals and field operators to quickly discriminate targets based on composition, counter adversary concealment or deception techniques, and identify items of interest based on chemical resonance that is visible only through the use of THz imaging
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Artificial Intelligence in the Operational Information Environment: The Need for Proactive Doctrine
Joint operations doctrine omits the agency of artificial intelligence (AI) in the operational information environment, which is a problem. This commentary discusses why, and recommends effective changes. Key points are as follows. AI is becoming an autonomous cause of unanticipated effects. Humans are not the most effectively intelligent actors in all environments, yet our doctrine draws lessons from the past rather than anticipating emergent futures. Machines currently excel in experience-based learning and can discover relationships in data that we cannot discern. Humans can intuit, deceive, somewhat control, and manufacture and destroy machines. In time, AI will be able to perform those cognitive, informational and physical functions as well. As out-thought becomes out-fought, we need proactive doctrine now.
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Winning Wars of Cognition: Posturing the Air Force for the Tactical Information Fight
With the return of Great Power Competition, the United States (US), Russia, and China are engaged in a persistent fight within the information environment. Each branch of military service within the US Department of Defense are developing concepts to fight within a contested information environment. Recently, the US Air Force established a new warfighting organization focused on Information Warfare (IW) based on a narrow definition that integrates Cyberspace, Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), Information, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations. Within this article, the author sets out on four objectives: first, to differentiate Information Warfare (IW) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war; second, to describe offensive and defensive IW considerations for the US Air Force; third, to describe the relationship between tactical IW and support to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC); and fourth, to provide initial recommendations regarding the USAF’s re-organization efforts.
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Air Force Decision Making Training
Dichotomous, black or white, answers are sufficient for initial qualification training, but are rarely the case in the real time battlespace. Just as the United States Air Force (USAF) changed its training philosophy after Vietnam, the USAF must update the current real time battlespace decision-making education to the Recognition Primed Decision-Making (RPDM) model and deliberately train its personnel in situations that require rapid decision making.
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Defining The Line: Why The Department of Defense Should Reconsider United States Space Command’s Area Of Responsibility
In announcing the reestablishment of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), the geographic combatant command also announced a new area of responsibility (AOR) for its warfighting domain. Typically, publication of a geographic combatant command’s AOR is routine, but, due to unique considerations in space law, USSPACECOM’s AOR is unprecedented. A reexamination of the AOR by USSPACECOM may avoid inadvertent, disadvantageous consequences, including the formation of international law.
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The Role of the Human in Systems of Systems: Example of the French Future Combat Air System
France is committed to design a Future Combat Air System (FCAS) relying on an architecture of networks, meshing inhabited and unmanned platforms within a System of Systems and fitting fully into the Man-Unmanned Aircraft teaming paradigm. Artificial intelligence (AI), Big Data Analytics, cloud computing and cyber-security are the four digital technologies at the heart of the digital transformation of our Air Force. All of this raises the question of the role of the Human in such a complex System of Systems.
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Streamlining and Revitalizing the US Hypersonic Weapon Investment Strategy
The current DoD hypersonic weapon investment strategy is untenable over the next three to four years which will widen the capability gap with Russia and China. The investment strategy needs to be streamlined based on acquisition, test, and fiscal realities to field a hypersonic weapon by 2023. In order to enable success, the DoD should begin to consolidate the hypersonic weapon efforts to one per service to help alleviate budgets, focus requirements, and reduce competition at test facilities.
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Strategic Rationale for Deep Space Operations
Authors Jefferson, Hans, and Wehrle use historical examples and national security to discuss the importance of deep space exploration and the requirement for advanced propulsion systems.
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OTH Commentary: The Future of Space
In the wake of SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy launch, OTH sat down with General Raymond, Commander, Air Force Space Command. Preview his interview here.
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OTH Video Interview with Gen Jay Raymond, Commander Air Force Space Command
General Jay Raymond discusses space as a warfighting domain and what the historic Falcon Heavy launch means for the military
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Orbital Red Tails: The Use of Escort Satellites to Defend National Intelligence Satellites
Undefended National Intelligence satellites require escort satellites to defend them based on the criticality of their service to national security.
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Air Force Culture Is Impeding The Space Mission
The culture of the Air Force is defined from the mission statement; to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. Air has always been the first domain in the mission and the main focus of the Air Force. Considering this cultural mindset, the other two domains in the mission statement will not receive the attention they need until the culture is changed.
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What Problem is the US Space Force Trying to Solve: Part 2
These are the final two problems facing the US when it comes to conflict in space. A Space Force can solve these problems, similar to the USAF in 1947.
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What Problem is a US Space Force Trying to Solve?
There are two problems facing the US when it comes to conflict in space. A Space Force can solve these problems, similar to the USAF in 1947.
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May We Mutate
The DoD, with all its branches and organizations, has adopted a model of pursuing innovation that creates peripheral spaces for experimentation and development, which has proven effective to an extent. The next steps to becoming inherently and organically innovative require focusing on the internal characteristics of the institution and its various bodies, from both cultural and systemic perspectives, to identify where mutation and adaptability can be incorporated into the smallest component parts. By adopting these measures, innovations can emerge organically from within their unique context, and those developed at the periphery can be adopted more easily and effectively, as adaptation enables more contextually appropriate integration.
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The 21st Century Scramble for Africa
The 2017 National Security Strategy states that the United States is in a great power competition with China and Russia that spans the globe. China and Russia have been actively promoting their national interests in Africa and competing with the United States’ vision for the continent. The following analysis will examine China and Russia’s activities in Africa and explain why the United States should be concerned with their increased influence.
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The 6th Warfighting Domain
From the end of the 20th into the 21st century, the line between military operations and daily civilian activities began to blur as operations increasingly came to rely on the space and cyberspace domains. Thus, new possibilities for reaching nonmilitary personnel in warfare were created. In 1991, the Gulf War highlighted the effectiveness of precision navigation and strike, as enabled by space assets. Now, the space domain enables combined arms integration across land, sea, and air. Working in concert with space, the cyberspace domain exponentially increases global connectivity and global reach. The current battlespace is so globally connected that civilian populations are held at risk, and the lines between civilian and military activity are ceasing to exist. War is increasingly taking on a different form and shifting from physical to virtual as the way to achieve victory.
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The Future of Fake News
Today, we have a new name to an old face: fake news. It seduces us for a variety of reasons: authority bias (considering information to be correct if given by an authoritative figure or organization), the third-person effect (perceiving ourselves as less likely to be swayed by the mass media or our own biases), confirmation bias (tending to look for information confirming our own preconceptions), etc. However, two recent developments, enabled by failing academic standards and artificial intelligence, are making it even easier to succumb to . . . while fake news continues its literal warpath, it is critical to look out for research misconduct and deepfakes.
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More Than Kinetic Effects: Globally Integrated Operations in the Information Environment
By Thomas A. Drohan Approximate Reading Time: 5 Minutes A recent YouTube video features Chief of Staff of the
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Great Power Competition in the Western Hemisphere
The 2017 National Security Strategy states that the United States is in great power competition with China and Russia that spans the world. China and Russia do not acknowledge the Monroe Doctrine’s assertion that the Western Hemisphere is the United States’ unchallenged sphere of influence and have been actively promoting their interests in the region. The following analysis will examine China and Russia’s activities in the Western Hemisphere in order to paint a picture of the breadth of influence operations that are being undertaken.
The United States must rebuild relationships with its allies and partners in the Western Hemisphere to mutually safeguard and protect the region. The problem should be framed as a common threat to regional stability and the United States should cooperate with its allies and partners on a peer-to-peer basis. The United States needs to be conscious of its stigma in Latin America as an imperial power that attempts to dictate foreign policy to others. The United States should strive to articulate why it offers the best model for future development and why China and Russia are harmful for the region.
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User-Centered Design is Critical to the Success of Multi-Domain Operations
By: Dr. Kristen K. Liggett and Dr. Gina F. Thomas Estimated Read Time: 11 minutes Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is the
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Leading the Waveform: Evolving Spectrum Leadership for Future Wars
Electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) incorporate a vast array of capabilities from space control to cyberspace operations, as well as the atmospheric effects traditionally known as electronic warfare (EW). These capabilities require the development of experts and leaders that integrate each niche mission set into robust EMSO that support multi-domain operations. Brig Gen Gaedecke stated that “the Air Force should deliberately refocus efforts on electronic warfare and the EMS as a whole.” This renewed focus must begin with the development of EMS leadership from tactical to senior levels to effectively advocate for solutions. Recognizing the EMS as a domain enables the joint force by highlighting its need for expertise, which then supports the critical problem solving and tactics development required to compete in future conflicts.
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Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to America’s Electric Grid: Counterpoints to Electric Power Research Institute Positions
Editor’s note: This article is part of a supporting engagement with the Electromagnetic Defense Task Force’s efforts in order to
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OODA Point: The Requirement for an Airman’s Approach to Operational Design (Part II)
The ability to make and execute timely and effective decisions has been the foundation of military success for millennia. In the next decade, however, Combined Force Air Component Commanders (CFACC) planning, decision, and execution (PDE) cycles will be confronted by unprecedented challenges emerging in the constantly evolving digital ecosystem. The era of unrivaled access to the electromagnetic spectrum and dominance in multiple domains is rapidly coming to a close for the US airpower. As more and more state and non-state actors gain access to advanced technology, the CFACC’s PDE cycles will transition from an observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop to an OODA point. This phenomenon will also have a significant influence on the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) measures necessary to shape and execute preplanned and emergent decisions in contested operational environments. One way of mitigating these nascent vulnerabilities is to develop a deliberate framework of operational design focused on airpower to provide a proactive form of vision for future CFACCs.
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