Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations where the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is no longer guaranteed must evolve to leverage emerging technologies and forward-deployed capabilities to maintain their competitive advantage in future conflicts. ISR operations are foundational for decision-making and must be available for battlefield commanders and forces operating on the forward edge of the battlespace during all phases of conflict. Traditional ISR concepts of operation, which rely on uncontested EMS dominance and rear-positioned reachback support, are no longer viable in peer-to-peer conflicts.  This is especially true within discussions surrounding the employment of airpower in an Agile Combat Employment (ACE) construct. Edge ISR breaks from traditional approaches to intelligence operations and emphasizes tasking, collection, and analysis in forward areas, which limits long communication lines and enables greater precision targeting.

Edge ISR is a transformative approach to intelligence operations that enables forward-deployed units to conduct self-tasked intelligence gathering, exploitation, and decision-making in contested environments without reachback support. This approach addresses the limitations of traditional ISR concepts by focusing on edge computing, mesh networking, and autonomous decision-making in volatile and uncertain operational environments. Rather than pursuing a single exquisite solution focused on EMS dominance, Edge ISR represents a fundamental shift in doctrine that embraces multiple complementary approaches to maintain effective ISR capabilities, delivering high-fidelity intelligence and enabling timely decision-making even when traditional connectivity is compromised. ACE strategies require effective ISR operations to be feasible in austere environments with limited infrastructure and connectivity. Integrating Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) into ISR missions offers a new aspect of multi-mission ISR platforms that can execute the entire Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, & Assess (F2T2EA) process without relying on reachback.

The Current ISR Framework and Challenges

The current ISR doctrine assumes complete EMS dominance, which allows blue forces to deny adversaries access to the spectrum while maintaining uninterrupted communication with rear-echelon assets through reachback. In the last twenty years of counterinsurgency environments, blue forces have operated unchallenged with no concern for connectivity. However, in peer-to-peer conflicts, where EMS control is contested, reachback operations and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) activities become unreliable, creating significant intelligence gaps. The current Intelligence doctrine assumes continuous connectivity between forward units, the Air Operations Center (AOC), and Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) assets. Technologies presumed resistant to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), such as SpaceX’s Starlink SATCOM systems, have proven vulnerable to disruption and degradation by Russian forces in Ukraine, demonstrating that no communication system is truly immune to contested environments.

A key challenge in the current framework is its dependence on centralized control, where there is constant coordination; however, it is not feasible in a contested environment where communication links are unreliable or nonexistent. These limitations are particularly evident in two cornerstones of future Air Force operations initiatives – the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and Agile Combat Employment.

The Air Force’s expected reliance on the capabilities of the Advanced Battle Management System underscores this vulnerability as senior military leaders intend to command and control assets across the battlespace through all domains. The ABMS concept requires reliable and adaptable connections to assets at the edge of the battlespace, across space, and the globe, ensuring commanders can maintain unified control even in the most contested environments. However, these technologies remain under development and have significant gaps in operational maturity.  These limitations underscore the need for ISR concepts and technology that accounts for contested environments and provides forward-deployed units with the tools and guidance to operate autonomously. With historically slow acquisition rates for new systems, the Department of Defense and the Air Force cannot afford to wait until ABMS is ready before they determine how to make operational and tactical changes to ISR systems.

Executing ACE in EMS-contested environments introduces additional complexities to ISR Operations as disaggregated organizations require longer lines of communication to transmit data for processing. ACE doctrine assumes forward-deployed units operate from austere locations closer to the adversary than to friendly main operating bases.  This proximity and limited infrastructure exacerbate the challenges of maintaining effective intelligence collection and dissemination. Forward-deployed units must contend with adversaries’ EMS denial efforts while finding ways to task, collect, process, and disseminate intelligence. Communication reachback is not guaranteed in ACE locations or at the edge of the battlespace, leading to a standard requirement between ACE and Edge ISR. While the EMS will be highly contested in future conflicts, the degree of contestation will vary.

In these scenarios with intermittent connectivity or limited bandwidth, a hybrid approach that combines traditional ISR with elements of Edge ISR might be more appropriate. Capabilities such as Edge Connect plan to use integrated warfare networks for users on the tactical edge to provide communications capabilities; however, these systems must still compete for open bandwidth on the EMS. A robust Edge ISR doctrine must define how forward units autonomously operate with limited or no reachback, establish contingency plans for ISR execution, and prioritize resource allocation to address these challenges.

Defining Edge ISR

Edge ISR represents a paradigm shift in intelligence operations, integrating autonomous software, onboard processing, meshed datalinks, and new systems with evolved tactics to operate differently than we’ve seen for the last twenty years. It empowers forward-deployed units to conduct intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination directly at the edge of the battlespace without relying on vulnerable communication links or centralized support, as the DCGS focuses more on strategic ISR. This approach, employing interconnected intelligence-gathering systems that generate actionable information without reliance on rear-echelon support, is essential in contested environments where traditional ISR methods, dependent on assured communications with command and control centers, are likely to fail.

As a force, we must be willing to go against the grain and challenge traditional ISR methods. Edge ISR establishes a framework for developing decentralized intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities in an electromagnetic spectrum-denied environment where support from teams at main operating bases is unreachable. It should incorporate newer technologies that use autonomous processing capable of Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination.

Imagine a forward line of troops equipped with backpack drones and RF antennae. These AI-powered drones autonomously fly and conduct reconnaissance, using computer vision to identify enemy targets without relying on vulnerable radio communications while reducing the chance of enemy signals intelligence detection. The system then transmits its findings directionally to reduce the probability of detection, revealing the troops’ position. Additionally, the troops can attempt to receive one-way signals from nearby air or ground systems, space systems, or HF transmissions to acquire exploited ISR information to avoid uplink EMI. This type of concept of operation would benefit the most from CCA, which has ISR sensors and onboard processing to exploit the information and disseminate it down to troops on the ground without exposing their location.

Time-sensitive intelligence, such as targeting data or early warning of enemy attacks, necessitates processing at the edge to enable rapid responses. However, a hybrid approach that leverages edge and reachback capabilities may be more effective for more complex analyses requiring extensive data correlation or specialized expertise. These concepts also promote a shared understanding among requirements teams across the Department of Defense to develop integrated user-agnostic ISR capabilities that meet emerging needs effectively.

Forward-deployed units under a veil of electromagnetic interference must be capable of self-tasking ISR missions and using timely dissemination to make mission command decisions. By prioritizing local decision-making and autonomous tasking, decentralized ISR models are essential for mitigating risks from adversarial EMS disruption and infrastructure limitations. Two further aspects of Edge ISR that will drive the paradigm shift are Artificial Intelligence and Collaborative Combat Aircraft.

Transforming ISR: Embracing Technological Revolution

We are witnessing a military revolution driven by the global race for AI supremacy. China’s substantial investments in AI research and development indicate their intention to leverage existing and emerging technologies to strengthen their military forces through software advancements. Despite having a military budget of approximately half that of the United States, China’s investments and advancements in AI capabilities illustrate how AI can serve as a force multiplier when there is a disparity in funding between the nations.

The United States Intelligence Community must prioritize developing and training self-tasking ISR missions that leverage advanced automation and AI-driven systems to prepare for future conflicts where mission assurance under EMI is not guaranteed. Forward-deployed units and weapon systems must be capable of independently tasking and executing ISR operations while seamlessly sharing intelligence within their operational sphere—entirely independent of the DCGS and the AOC. This shift requires significant changes to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) while practicing these concepts in exercises where connectivity is contested to teach the ISR forces and the rest of the Department of Defense to operate on the edge without reachback support. Self-tasking ISR missions may include unmanned assets arriving on station off-tether, operating under the assumed control of forward units to execute missions while feeding data to the units.

Additionally, Edge ISR must also emphasize interoperability among joint and allied forces. Developing standardized data sharing, cooperative classification, and communication protocols ensures that ISR assets from different services and nations can operate seamlessly from the conception of their programs. This is particularly important in coalition operations, where sharing intelligence and coordinating actions across diverse platforms and domains is critical to mission success. An example of successful execution is the F-35 Multi-Function Advanced Datalink system that integrates seamlessly between all countries that fly the aircraft.

Collaborative Combat Aircraft or loyal wingman-type systems present new opportunities for Edge ISR operations by providing attritable assets capable of operating in contested airspace while serving as sensors, onboard processing with automatic target recognition, communication gateways, and weapons platforms for target engagement. These platforms’ multi-role nature allows multiple aircraft to perform ISR functions while defending airspace or assets. As unmanned systems, CCAs require robust communication links for control via reachback or direct data links to nearby manned aircraft to fulfill their role as loyal wingmen. These systems can perform additional functions, such as electronic warfare and battlefield airborne communications nodes, as seen on the E-11A.

CCA can bridge gaps between isolated units and higher command structures as a communications relay by allowing continuous information flow in environments where traditional networks are contested. Their ability to operate autonomously makes the system indispensable for maintaining situational awareness and enabling coordinated operations in contested environments. Suppose the TTPs or doctrine developed for operating without connection to higher echelons is not thoroughly developed. In that case, these CCA systems will fail to achieve their end-state of successfully operating as loyal wingmen and demonstrate a relevant contribution to the ISR mission. Integrating CCAs or similar systems into Edge ISR operations enhances the flexibility and scalability of ISR execution and connectivity, ensuring that forward units can operate independently while working towards mission objectives. This can be achieved by executing reconnaissance missions and using onboard processing to determine what is found via automatic target recognition and disseminated down to the troops below using directional or low probability of detection data links to avoid exposing the location of the ground troops.

Conclusion

Edge ISR offers a critical pathway to overcome the current limitations of contested environments and maintain decision-making superiority by enabling decentralized intelligence gathering, autonomous analysis, and resilient communication. The United States Air Force must prioritize developing and implementing Edge ISR concepts to address the complex challenges of contested environments. The Department of Defense must advance decentralized ISR Frameworks by shifting from centralized models to decentralized ISR operations, empowering forward-deployed units to operate independently with minimal reliance on reachback support. They must also leverage emerging technologies and accelerate the integration of AI-driven systems and autonomous platforms to enhance real-time decision-making and improve resilience against electromagnetic spectrum denial. They must exercise contested ISR operations by creating desired learning objectives for exercises that simulate contested EMS environments to prepare ISR operators and edge-based units for future conflicts. Additionally, they must strengthen interoperability by promoting collaborative ISR capabilities among joint and allied forces through standardized protocols, shared intelligence platforms, and classification. Finally, they must expand collaborative ISR platforms by fully integrating CCA and similar systems into ISR roles, emphasizing their potential as ISR platforms and communication relays to help sustain connectivity while contributing to the sensing grid.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force or the U.S. Government.