Maneuver at Lightspeed: Electromagnetic Spectrum as a Domain
Maneuver at Lightspeed: Electromagnetic Spectrum as a Domain
Read moreManeuver at Lightspeed: Electromagnetic Spectrum as a Domain
Read moreElectromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) incorporate a vast array of capabilities from space control to cyberspace operations, as well as the atmospheric effects traditionally known as electronic warfare (EW). These capabilities require the development of experts and leaders that integrate each niche mission set into robust EMSO that support multi-domain operations. Brig Gen Gaedecke stated that “the Air Force should deliberately refocus efforts on electronic warfare and the EMS as a whole.” This renewed focus must begin with the development of EMS leadership from tactical to senior levels to effectively advocate for solutions. Recognizing the EMS as a domain enables the joint force by highlighting its need for expertise, which then supports the critical problem solving and tactics development required to compete in future conflicts.
Read moreEditor’s note: This article is part of a supporting engagement with the Electromagnetic Defense Task Force’s efforts in order to
Read moreNon-Kinetic Effects (NKE) do not have accepted measures of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and never will. New ways of measuring effectiveness are required to ensure Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) dominance. Time to Effect (TTE) revitalizes Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop to inform modern kill chains. Sensor Rating (SR) borrows from the National Football League’s Passer Rating to measure sensor effectiveness. TTE and SR fill a growing gap and will enable better integration and execution of NKE.
Read moreIn multi-domain operations (MDO), control of the electromagnetic spectrum is of paramount importance. By leveraging machine learning technologies coupled to advanced Electronic Warfare techniques, a key first step will be taken in enabling maneuver warfare within the spectrum.
Read moreCommunications are an important element of any military operation. A lack of infrastructure and rough terrain have hindered U.S. military operations in Afghanistan (2001-Present) and Iraq (2003-Present). The difficulties encountered in both countries initially led to several different ad hoc solutions for overcoming poor communications. Eventually a long-term solution emerged, known as BACN (Battlefield Airborne Communications Node) with two dedicated platforms, an E-11A and EQ-4B. This article provides new insights on the BACN program and its history, and considers the importance of E-11s providing BACN for future multi-domain warfighting environments. Finally, it encourages new ways of thinking on how to operate in a contested environment, proposing a “BACN-mesh” concept as a way of overcoming such a vulnerability with an adversary jamming the electromagnetic spectrum.
Read moreThe terahertz (THz) frequency band is a fascinating and relatively unexplored part of the larger electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). THz can enable users to ‘see-through’ materials and structures and is now widely used in laboratory quality control testing, for non-destructive testing and transmitting information between servers in close proximity. However, because the transmitted signal degrades rapidly in the atmosphere, its application is limited to controlled settings. Soon, technological leaps will enable development of power sources that will prevent THz degradation in the atmosphere and at distance. When this happens, THz will be an exquisite tool to help the United States find and target items of interest. It will allow intelligence professionals and field operators to quickly discriminate targets based on composition, counter adversary concealment or deception techniques, and identify items of interest based on chemical resonance that is visible only through the use of THz imaging
Read moreWith the return of Great Power Competition, the United States (US), Russia, and China are engaged in a persistent fight within the information environment. Each branch of military service within the US Department of Defense are developing concepts to fight within a contested information environment. Recently, the US Air Force established a new warfighting organization focused on Information Warfare (IW) based on a narrow definition that integrates Cyberspace, Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), Information, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations. Within this article, the author sets out on four objectives: first, to differentiate Information Warfare (IW) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war; second, to describe offensive and defensive IW considerations for the US Air Force; third, to describe the relationship between tactical IW and support to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC); and fourth, to provide initial recommendations regarding the USAF’s re-organization efforts.
Read moreThe ability to make and execute timely and effective decisions has been the foundation of military success for millennia. In the next decade, however, Combined Force Air Component Commanders (CFACC) planning, decision, and execution (PDE) cycles will be confronted by unprecedented challenges emerging in the constantly evolving digital ecosystem. The era of unrivaled access to the electromagnetic spectrum and dominance in multiple domains is rapidly coming to a close for the US airpower. As more and more state and non-state actors gain access to advanced technology, the CFACC’s PDE cycles will transition from an observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop to an OODA point. This phenomenon will also have a significant influence on the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) measures necessary to shape and execute preplanned and emergent decisions in contested operational environments. One way of mitigating these nascent vulnerabilities is to develop a deliberate framework of operational design focused on airpower to provide a proactive form of vision for future CFACCs.
Read moreBuilding a common operating picture from data stored in a cloud environment and creating the illusion of the availability of perfect information creates three large risks: joint forces become more vulnerable to Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) attacks and reflexive control strategies; command, control, and execution become increasingly centralized; and an information-denied environment causes decision paralysis.
By Katrina Schweiker
Editor’s note: The following article is the third of a three-part series discussing necessary advancements which will best enable the Department of Defense to continue to lead during current and future periods of competition. Part I focused on the history of the current threats, Part II outlined areas of defense and civilian research which must be pursued, and Part III delves into the path forward for cohesive, joint application of technology and research.
Read moreEditor’s note: The following article is the first of a three-part series discussing necessary advancements which will best enable the Department of Defense to continue to lead during current and future periods of competition. Part I briefly reviews threats America has faced thru history and those which it currently faces across all domains. Part II outlines areas of defense and civilian research which must be pursued, and Part III delves into the path forward for cohesive, joint application of technology and research.
Read moreScience Fiction has always been a vehicle to the future. In the modern era of conversations about complexity, AI, human machine interfaces, and other exotic ideas, the genre can provide a way to stitch things together. We can take all of these disparate developments, operating concepts, and fuzzy ideas and combine them the same way our ancestors made sense of the word: with a story. At the strategic level, the two nations in conflict here have taken a markedly different approach to developing today’s technological trends. The enemy nation of Donovia has invested heavily in autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI), taking a bet that they can teach and grow better algorithms. Christopherson’s side, however, has taken a more balanced approach to integrating AI and autonomy by preserving man-on-the-loop for action and keeping their strategic level AI providing intelligence fusion. Different strategies will influence the future of technology development, but more importantly strategy will dictate how we use those technologies.
Read moreIn 21st Century warfare, social media fuels influence through “likes,” “shares,” and “tweets” driving narratives that blur the lines of politics, law, war, peace, elections, and freedom of speech and press, creating an information crisis. The current lack of an adequate United States (US) response to this crisis threatens its democratic institutions and national security. Bolstering this emerging threat are social media platforms rewarding users for engaging as fast thinkers without regard for bias or manipulation that is being exploited by hostile state and non-state actors to create narratives resulting in the decay of truth. Compounding this problem is social media’s ability to transition influence from institutions and governments to the individual. Though social media-enabled information warfare alone may not be decisive in current and future conflicts, nations must prepare to counter its effects across all instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
Read moreThis paper argues the DoD should apply the SOF construct of earned trust and interpersonal relationships in order to be successful in future Multi Domain Operations. The author describes how intelligently and appropriately pushing decision making abilities to the lowest possible level will mitigate the communication challenges that will be prevalent in future conflict.
Read moreBy: Ernest Nisperos Approximate Reading Time: 25 Minutes Abstract This paper aims to generate a tangible construct to complement the
Read moreBy Thomas A. Drohan Approximate Reading Time: 5 Minutes A recent YouTube video features Chief of Staff of the
Read moreBy: Dr. Jeffrey Reilly Approximate Reading Time: 15 Minutes Abstract: The ability to make and execute timely and effective decisions
Read moreThe term “quantum” has been thrown around in the past few years to mean anything from extremely fast internet to the next wave in computing. The truth is “quantum” can be applied to a variety of technologies; but is all based off the theories of quantum mechanics, or how sub-atomic particles interact and behave. Like Schrödinger’s Cat, this abstract is quantum-based, it both exists and doesn’t exist, until you read it just now.
Read moreThe military services are continuing to forge the way in MDO, but what progress has been made and will they be able to achieve joint efficiency?
Read moreWithin the context of multi-domain operations, the human domain is arguably the most important domain, but it is often the most overlooked. This article proposes implementation of the domain through the use of planning for desired behaviors prior to conflict. It also discusses how Russia views information warfare, their practices, and a case study of its importance in the Crimean Annexation.
Read moreUnderstanding Special Operations role in MDO; SOCOM offers an integration model to be replicated, and SOF’s role in a near-peer MDO conflict.
Read moreThis article identifies the potential of international accidents across domains and identifies factors decision makers must consider before/after an accident.
Read moreThe United States Air Force (USAF) recognizes a need for future innovations as near-peer competitors make rapid advancements in military capabilities. However, the current USAF system does not facilitate keeping up with these competitors. Innovation requires a cultural shift regarding risk acceptability at all levels, starting with leaders. The USAF can facilitate this shift by further addressing regulatory guidance and Professional Military Education programs. Until the USAF as an organization is willing to accept risks and ultimately failures to achieve success, mission impacting innovations will continue to be elusive.
Read moreMulti-domain theory contains the potential for problem-based—rather than Service-based—solutions, leading to increased options for warfighters and decision-makers while presenting adversaries with increasing dilemmas.
By Jon Bott
It is important to recognize multi-domain operations as an important new operational concept that is more mindset than prescribed method, one that evolves previous thought, and one that itself deserves continued development.
By Jonathan Bott
Estimated Reading Time: 7 minutes Editor’s Note: This week we will be republishing a 3-part series focused on the idea
Read moreEditor’s Note: This is one of our favorite articles we wanted to re-post to keep the conversation moving. We will
Read moreThe modern operational environment will force a change in operations at all levels, to include C4ISR. You can’t command without control. You can’t control without communications.
Read moreThe Air Force is not ready to deter or prevail against a near-peer adversary, to remain competitive in the 21st century fight the service must have a paradigm shift to give maneuverability back to the warfighter.
Read moreThis is the first article in a multi-part series focused on modernizing Command and Control (C2) of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
Read moreRussia’s military reorganization and its operations in Ukraine indicate it is intentionally developing a multi-domain force.
Read moreDr. Jeff Reilly discusses the need for the Multi Doman Operational Strategist
Read moreThis is an overview of the conversation on what multi domain operations and multi domain C2 continues to define what those terms mean as Airman.
Read moreAs tactical-level warfare evolves, the emerging security environment will likely drive a level of chaos and friction that has not happened in recent conflicts. To effectively execute MDO in a contested environment, preparing Mission Commanders to act decisively will be essential.
Read moreWithout a public discourse on autonomy, there might not be anything left worth fighting over.
Read moreThe maritime domain as defined by joint doctrine is overly broad in concept and does not accurately capture the opportunities and vulnerabilities presented in the undersea.
Read moreA domain is a “Critical macro maneuver space whose access or control is vital to the freedom of action and superiority required by the mission.”
Read moreMultidomain Observing and Orienting: ISR to Meet the Emerging Battlespace
Read moreThe US has a problem on her hands, and the emerging answers fail to address the real problem. While military
Read moreA German officer compares the NATO planning process with the ACSC Multi-domain approach.
Read moreUSCYBERCOM presents an opportunity to effectively implement human domain forces in a high-threat, resource constrained environment. Estimated Reading Time: 5
Read moreThinking about conflict in terms of quantum mechanics rather than Newtonian physics will produce more comprehensive grand strategy.
Read moreThe evolution from joint to multidomain requires a shift toward a more team oriented culture among peer officers.
Read moreIn the future operating environment, to successfully deter and defeat our adversaries, we must better understand how the domains interact and their basic principles.
Read moreEmphasizing information operations in multi-domain operations elevates multi-domain ops and integrated warfare
Read moreThe recent NSS and NDS elevate multi-domain ops to the forefront of US national strategy. The upcoming NMS must capitalize on this framework.
Read moreTwo decades of swarming optimization research lay the groundwork for the development of physical swarming techniques.
Read moreToday’s editor’s pick was chosen by Julie Janson. In it, Tom Flounders makes a compelling argument that the Human Domain is the decisive domain.
Read moreAs part of the OTH anniversary series, this article, by Dr. Jeffrey Reilly, forms a foundation for discussing multi-domain operations.
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